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RIPSTEIN, RAWLS, AND RESPONSIBILITY 
Stephen Perry* 
Arthur Ripstein's article, The Division of Responsibility and the 
Law of Tort,1 is primarily concerned with an age-old but nonetheless 
perennially intriguing question, which is, what is the proper 
relationship between corrective and distributive justice? The answer 
he offers to that question is complex and subtle, and while it is 
advanced within a Rawlsian framework, it does not represent Rawls's 
own explicit position. As Ripstein notes, Rawls does not address this 
subject in any detail. Rawls maintains that corrective justice-the 
justice of interpersonal transactions-presupposes a just distribution/ 
and also that it has a certain independence from distributive justice.3 
There are well known difficulties with reconciling these two claims, 4 
and Rawls himself says little to show how the required reconciliation 
can be achieved. Ripstein's very interesting suggestion is that the 
solution to this problem is implicit in Rawls's notion of a "social 
division of responsibility."5 In this Essay, I want very briefly to sketch 
Ripstein's proposal and offer a couple of preliminary observations 
about its viability. 
Ripstein argues that the deeper Rawlsian solution to the 
corrective/distributive problem cannot be regarded as having its roots 
in the methodology of the original position. This is so for two reasons. 
The first is the fairly straightforward point that the original position is 
an expository device, so that we can only get out of it what we have 
already put in. The second and more serious reason, however, builds 
on Thomas Pogge's argument that the methodology of the 
hypothetical contract is unavoidably consequentialist and aggregative 
in character. 6 This is because the parties in the original position are 
choosing principles that govern very general and pervasive 
*Fiorello La Guardia Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, New York 
University School of Law. 
1. Arthur Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility and the Law of Tort, 72 
Fordham Law Review 1811 (2004). 
2. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 9-10 (rev. ed. 1999); John Rawls, Political 
Liberalism 266 (1993). 
3. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 2, at 266-69. 
4. See Stephen R. Perry, On the Relationship Between Corrective and Distributive 
Justice, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 4th Series 239 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000). 
5. John Rawls, Social Unity and Primary Goods, in Utilitarianism and Beyond 
159, 165 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982). 
6. Thomas Pogge, Three Problems with Contractarian-Consequentialist Ways of 
Assessing Social Institutions, 12 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y 241 (1995). 
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institutional arrangements-the basic structure of society, in Rawls's 
phrase-and in doing so they focus exclusively on outcomes rather 
than on, say, individual actions: "[T]he problem with the contract 
argument is that the parties in the original position attach value only 
to states of affairs."7 It is, however, individual actions, rather than 
states of affairs, that comprise the domain of corrective justice. 
Beyond that, the structure of corrective justice and tort law is, as 
Ripstein correctly observes, deontological in nature: It assumes that 
there are universal obligations, in the form of constraints on action, 
which every individual owes to every other individual. The 
hypothetical contract does not offer a promising foundation for 
explaining this structure because in the original position "the 
distinction between harms that I suffer in general and those harms 
that are brought about through the wrongdoing of others is invisible. "8 
Ripstein thinks that Rawls's arguments for his two principles of justice 
nonetheless survive this criticism of the methodology of the original 
position, thereby deflecting challenges from libertarianism, 
utilitarianism, and skeptical egalitarianism, because those arguments 
are ultimately grounded in Rawls's conception of the person rather 
than in the hypothetical contract as such. That conception supposes 
that moral persons are moved by two highest-order moral interests, 
which are the interests such persons have in realizing and exercising 
the two capacities of moral personality. Those capacities are, in turn, 
"the capacity for a sense of right and justice ... and the capacity to 
decide upon, to revise and rationally to pursue a conception of the 
good."9 
Ripstein argues that the independence of corrective from 
distributive justice can likewise be established within a Rawlsian 
framework without appeal to the hypothetical contract or the original 
position. As a practical matter, "independence" here means the 
establishment of institutions of tort law, and of private law generally, 
which assess interactions between persons in their own terms, and 
thus without direct reference to background distributive concerns. 
Ripstein's starting-point in defending this claim about independence 
is, as was noted earlier, Rawls's "division of social responsibility" 
between society and the individual. Rawls maintains that once we 
have all been provided with a just and adequate share of primary 
7. Ripstein, supra note 1, at 1823. The argument is reminiscent of Ernest 
Weinrib's criticisms of Charles Fried's early attempt to defend a Kantian 
interpretation of tort law. Fried attempted to ground that interpretation in a "risk 
pool" that was viewed from the perspective of a contractarian original position. See 
Charles Fried, An Anatomy of Values: Problems of Personal and Social Choice 61-
66, 183-200 (1970). Weinrib argued, among other things, that such an approach 
"would lack the required structure of corrective justice." Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward a 
Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 Law & Phil. 37, 46, 56 (1983). 
8. Ripstein, supra note 1, at 1823. 
9. Rawls, Social Unity and Primary Goods, supra note 5, at 164-65. 
HeinOnline -- 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1847 2003-2004
2004] RIPSTEIN, RAWLS & RESPONSIBILITY 1847 
goods, we each have a special responsibility to make what we will of 
our own lives within the constraints set by the two principles of 
justice. 10 Ripstein suggests, plausibly enough, that this division of 
responsibility entails that we may not demand more than our fair 
share of resources if we make a choice that we come to regret, nor is it 
up to society to choose a conception of the good on our behalf. 11 Each 
individual uses his fair share of primary goods to choose and pursue a 
conception of the good for himself; each uses those goods, in other 
words, to exercise the second moral power. 
The crucial step in Ripstein's argument is the claim that there is a 
further dimension to the Rawlsian division of responsibility. The 
special responsibility of moral persons extends, he argues, beyond the 
relationship between individuals and society to encompass relations 
among individuals themselves. It is, on Ripstein's view, this extension 
of the notion of special responsibility that grounds both the 
independence of corrective justice and its deontological content. The 
special responsibility we each have for our own lives would be 
seriously undermined, he suggests, if individuals were allowed to 
displace some of the costs of their own life-plans onto others. 12 If 
someone wrongs me by using what is mine without my consent, she 
violates my special responsibility for my own life "by making use of 
powers or goods that are mine in pursuit of something that is not part 
of my conception of the good."13 If she wrongs me by damaging some 
of my resources as a by-product of her own activities, "(she] 
interfere[s] with my ability to take responsibility for my own life . . .  
(by depriving] me of the means I (previously] had to do so."14 One of 
the appropriate institutional responses to either type of wrong-there 
may be others, such as criminal punishment-is the paradigmatic tort 
remedy of an award of damages, the purpose of which is to make the 
victim whole. The imposition of such a remedy will, of course, change 
the pattern of holdings in society, but Ripstein argues that the change 
is acceptable from a Rawlsian point of view precisely because it is 
traceable to the special responsibility of the wrongdoer. 15 Rawlsian 
distributive justice calls for certain institutional arrangements, such as 
10. See id. 
[S]ociety, the citizens as a collective body, accepts the responsibility for 
maintaining the equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity, and for 
providing a fair share of the other primary goods for everyone within this 
framework, while citizens (as individuals) and associations accept the 
responsibility for revising and adjusting their ends and aspirations in view of 
the all-purpose means they can expect, given their present and foreseeable 
situation. 
Jd. at 170. 
11. Ripstein, supra note 1, at 1831. 
12. /d. 
13. /d. at 1833. 
14. /d. 
15. /d. at 1840-41. 
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progressive taxation, rather than for a specific pattern of holdings. 
Part of the reason for adopting an institutional approach is to allow 
for changes in holdings that result from the choices of individuals, and 
the changes that are associated with the rectification of a wrong are 
appropriately viewed as flowing from just such a choice.16 Ripstein 
puts the point by saying that if I wrong you and I have to pay damages 
as a result, "[i]t is as though I had injured myself, or damaged my own 
property."17 
This is a very interesting argument, and I believe that it contains an 
important kernel of truth about the relationship between corrective 
and distributive justice. But I also believe the argument cannot bear 
the entire weight of the conclusions that Ripstein hopes to derive from 
it. My discussion, which will inevitably be too brief to do justice to 
Ripstein's rich and subtle development of Rawlsian themes, will focus 
on two related issues. The first concerns the methodology that is 
presupposed by Ripstein's argument. The second concerns the range 
and character of the possible social arrangements that the underlying 
methodology would recognize as permissible. 
Let me discuss the methodological issue first. As was noted above, 
Ripstein accepts Pogge's argument that the reasoning of parties in the 
original position will inevitably be consequentialist in character, 
because the parties are concerned with the assessment of states of 
affairs rather than with the assessment of individual actions. I agree 
with Ripstein that Pogge's argument is compelling and, consequently, 
also agree that the deontological content of tort law cannot be derived 
from the methodology of the hypothetical contract. But this rejection 
of Rawls's own preferred methodology very quickly leads us to ask 
what methodology underlies Ripstein's Rawls-inspired argument from 
the division of responsibility. Ripstein is clearly emphasizing and 
relying upon the Kantian strand in Rawls's thinking. But if we are not 
simply to turn Rawls into Kant there must presumably be something 
distinctively Rawlsian about the argument. Kant's own methodology 
for establishing first-order moral conclusions is essentially conceptual 
in character, and it makes strong metaphysical assumptions about 
noumenal selves. Rawls introduced the notion of the original position 
precisely in order to avoid these aspects of Kant's approach: 
The original position may be viewed, then, as a procedural 
interpretation of Kant's conception of autonomy and the categorical 
imperative within the 'framework of an empirical theory. The 
principles regulative of the kingdom of ends are those that would be 
chosen in this position, and the description of this situation enables 
us to explain the sense in which acting from these principles 
16. Elsewhere I have defended essentially the same view of how it is that 
corrective justice can change the pattern of holdings without affecting the justice of 
those holdings. See Perry, supra note 4, at 253-63. 
' 17. Ripstein, supra note 1, at 1841. 
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expresses our nature as free and equal rational persons. No longer 
are these notions purely transcendent and lacking explicable 
connections with human conduct, for the procedural conception of 
the original position allows us to make these ties.18 
As this and many other passages in both Rawls's early and later 
work make abundantly clear, the ultimate foundation for his theory of 
justice is his conception of the person as free and equal. The equality 
of persons is embodied in the capacity for a sense of right and justice, 
while freedom is embodied in the capacity to decide upon, to revise, 
and rationally to pursue a conception of the good. It is important to 
note that in the quoted passage Rawls recasts the categorical 
imperative "within the framework of an empirical theory."19 This is a 
point to which I shall return shortly. It is also important to remember 
that Rawls characterizes his conception of the person in terms of two 
highest-order interests that individuals have in exercising their two 
moral powers. 2 0  Any distinctively Rawlsian methodology must 
preserve this feature, and Ripstein's argument does, in fact, preserve 
it. For example, he endorses Rawls's conclusion that the rules 
governing individual transactions between persons must include rules 
permitting contractsY Ripstein characterizes the two main premises 
that support this conclusion as follows. First, "[m]y interest in having 
both my own powers .. . is an interest in having those things at my 
disposal, that is, to have them available to me, so as to pursue and 
revise my own conception of the good."2 2 Second, "[t]he power to 
enter into contracts makes distributive shares valuable to people in 
pursuing their own conceptions of the good.' m  It is this idea of 
making fair shares of primary goods valuable for purposes of 
choosing, revising and pursuing a conception of the good that is key. 
This idea must of course be given effect within a context of equality. 
Rawlsian persons do not want as much freedom as possible. Rather 
they want "as much freedom to set and pursue [their] own conception 
of the good as [they] can have in a way that is consistent with others 
having the same.'' 2 4  Still, the core of the argument is the idea that 
"[ d]istributive shares are important because they enable choice[;] . . .  
they are the things wanted by parties concerned to protect their own 
ability to decide for themselves how to live their lives.'' 2 5  
There are two main points to note about the methodology of 
Ripstein's argument, as thus construed. The first is that it preserves 
18. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 2, at 226. 
19. Jd. 
20. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
21. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 2, at 265-69. 
22. Ripstein, supra note 1, at 1837. 
23. ld. at 1838. 
24. Id. at 1832. 
25. Jd. at 1834. 
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the empirical character of Rawls's recasting of the categorical 
imperative. I will speak of the means for "enabling choice," to use 
Ripstein's convenient phrase, as shorthand to refer to the means for 
protecting the ability to decide for oneself how to live one's life. It is 
clear that different social arrangements can enable choice in different 
degrees, so that the preferable set of arrangements is the one that 
enables choice to the greatest degree that is consistent with equal 
enablement for all. But the determination of which set of 
arrangements that might be is an empirical question. At times 
Ripstein's argument from the division of social responsibility seems to 
be an almost purely conceptual argument about what it means to 
"have" one's fair share of resources, as when, for example, he 
maintains that "I only have things as my own to use in forming, 
pursuing and revising my conception of the good inasmuch [as] others 
are under an obligation to avoid interfering with them."2 6 This 
proposition is undoubtedly true, but its truth is consistent with many 
different conceptions of what the obligations of others are, and the 
determination of which conception is optimal from the perspective of 
equal enablement of choice is clearly an empirical matter. Even more 
importantly, Ripstein is only in a position to make the conceptual 
claim because he implicitly assumes (along with Rawls) that "having 
one's share" is to be understood by reference to what Honore calls 
"the 'liberal' concept of 'full' individual ownership."27 This means, 
more particularly, that individuals have both a liberty to use and a 
right to exclusive possession. Once we have a right to exclusive 
possession then of course it follows as a conceptual matter that others 
are under a correlative duty. But what is minimally required to set 
and pursue a conception of the good is simply access to resources, i.e., 
a liberty to use resources. The argument that persons should also 
have a right to exclusive possession must be that the recognition of 
such a right will improve their (equal) capacity to set and pursue a 
conception of the good, as compared to a mere liberty to use.2 8 This is 
a plausible enough claim, but the important point for present purposes 
is that it is empirical in nature. More generally, the meaning of 
"having one's fair share" must be determined at every point by an 
empirical inquiry into the optimal means for enabling choice in the 
requisite sense. 
26. /d. at 1840. 
27. A.M. Honore, Ownership, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 1st Series 107, 
107 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961). 
28. Ripstein does not discuss the concept of property in any detail in The Division 
of Responsibility and the Law of Tort, but he says more elsewhere. See Arthur 
Ripstein, Authority and Coercion, 32 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 2, 11-12 (2004). He argues 
there that the concept of "secure title" involves both possession and use, and that 
"[s]ecure title in things is prerequisite to the capacity to both set and pursue ends." /d. 
at 12. For the reasons given in the text, this is too strong a claim. 
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The second point to be observed about Ripstein's methodology is 
that it must be characterized as consequentialist in character. The key 
element of his argument concerns the choice of institutional 
arrangements that will best advance an individual interest, namely, the 
interest that moral persons have in the exercise of their capacity to set 
and pursue a conception of the good. The choice among different 
institutional arrangements is simply a choice among different states of 
affairs, and it is thus consequentialist in precisely the sense that 
Ripstein recognizes in accepting Pogge's criticism of the methodology 
of the original position. It is true that Ripstein concludes that the 
optimal social arrangement will be one that incorporates distinct 
institutions to regulate redistribution on the one hand and interaction 
among individuals on the other, but this conclusion must ultimately 
depend on an empirical determination that such an arrangement best 
advances the interest that Rawlsian persons have in enabling choice. 
The content of the conclusion does not call into question the 
consequentialist character of the argument that must be advanced to 
support it. It is also true that the supporting argument must respect 
the equality of persons, but this point too is completely consistent with 
the argument's consequentialist character. After all, Rawls's purpose 
in introducing the idea of the original position was simply to make 
perspicuous the constraints that equality places on the choice of 
principles that are to regulate the basic structure; as Ripstein 
observes, the original position is at bottom an expository device. 
Ripstein's argument from the division of responsibility does not 
employ that device. But, because the argument makes a case for one 
institutional arrangement over others on the grounds that a particular 
interest that all persons have will be optimally advanced under 
conditions of equality, it is fundamentally similar to arguments that 
do. If you are a Rawlsian, it is not as easy as all that to escape from 
the original position. 
This brings me to the second of the two related issues that 
Ripstein's argument from the division of responsibility raises. This 
issue, which follows naturally from the methodological questions that 
have just been considered, concerns the range and character of the 
possible institutional arrangements that the methodology of Ripstein's 
argument would recognize as permissible. In light of the discussion in 
the preceding two paragraphs, a fundamental premise of the argument 
must be the empirical claim that recognizing and enforcing 
interpersonal rights and obligations having a strong deontological 
content will not only advance the interest that Rawlsian persons have 
in enabling choice, but it will do so better than any other possible 
institutional arrangements. Perhaps this claim is true. But, because it 
is an empirical claim, it is perfectly conceivable that other institutional 
arrangements, which either recognize interpersonal rights and 
obligations that deviate from the content of traditional deontology or 
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which do not draw a strict line between corrective and distributive 
justice, might be justified instead. It is important not to be misled 
here by Ripstein's dual use of the term "responsibility." 
"Responsibility" for how one's life goes is not the same as 
"responsibility" for (certain of) the effects that one's actions have on 
others. For anyone with deontological sympathies it is of course 
natural to think that there is responsibility of the latter kind. But I 
take Ripstein to be arguing that deontological rights and obligations 
can be derived from the special responsibility that Rawlsian persons 
have for how their own life goes. For the reasons that were examined 
earlier, the derivation must depend on the empirical-and hence 
contingent-claim just described. There is thus nothing inevitable 
about the conclusions Ripstein reaches regarding the content and 
independence of corrective justice. Given the consequentialist 
character of the argument, it must in the end be regarded as 
essentially a coincidence that the rights and obligations to which it 
points happen to be coextensive with those recognized by traditional 
deontological theory. 
Let me illustrate the point of the preceding paragraph with some 
concrete examples. As I remarked earlier, once the idea of "having 
one's fair share" is understood in terms of the liberal conception of 
full individual ownership, it follows as a conceptual matter that others 
are under a duty to respect my right to exclusive possession. This is 
the kernel of truth in Ripstein's argument from the division of 
responsibility. But, as I also remarked earlier, a Rawlsian defense of 
the conclusion that distributive justice should be understood by 
reference to full individual ownership must rest on the empirical 
assumption that this is the best way to advance the interest that 
Rawlsian persons have in enabling choice. Even when reciprocal 
duties to respect others' right to exclusive possession of their shares 
have been recognized, however, there is no reason why the duties that 
individuals owe to one another should be limited to the negative 
duties of traditional deontological theory. Consider, for example, 
Ripstein's discussion of the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction. He 
argues that because free and equal persons "can only be interested in 
shares of primary goods if they have them in the requisite sense,"2 9 
they cannot be under any obligation to confer benefits on one 
another, no matter how significant the benefit or how easy it might be 
to confer it. "Such an obligation would undermine the sense in which 
what they have is their own."3 0 But why should this be? While the 
argument has a conceptual flavor, there is no reason why the idea of 
having one's share should be undermined by, say, a duty of easy 
29. Ripstein, supra note 1, at 1839. 
30. /d. at 1840. 
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rescueY The claim must rather be psychological, and therefore 
empirical, in character. Understood in that way, however, it is not 
particularly plausible. Moreover, this does not even seem to be the 
right kind of argument. As we saw earlier, on a Rawlsian approach 
the appropriate conception of fair shares must be spelled out at every 
point by reference to empirical claims about what set of institutional 
arrangements best advances the interest in enabling choice. If, as 
might well be the case, that interest would be better served by a 
general duty of easy rescue than by a regime of pure negative duties,3 2 
then the conceptual contours of "having one's share" are determined 
accordingly. There is no independent conception of that notion that is 
available to be undermined. 
The example of the preceding paragraph showed that the 
interpersonal rights and obligations that could permissibly be justified 
under the methodology of Ripstein's argument might not coincide 
with the content of traditional deontological theory. Consider next a 
set of examples that shows how the line between institutions of 
corrective and of distributive justice might be blurred. Assume that 
distributive shares are properly defined by reference to the liberal 
conception of full individual ownership; individuals thus have a duty 
to respect one another's rights of exclusive possession. Perhaps the 
existence of a right of exclusive possession conceptually entails the 
existence of a right to be compensated by someone who violates the 
primary right; I express no view on that issue here. However, even if 
there is such a conceptual entailment, it does not follow that there 
cannot be public rights of compensation that might supplement or 
even replace individuals' private remedial rights. Consider victim 
compensation schemes, workers' compensation plans, or a general 
New Zealand-style compensation program. All of these involve 
compulsory redistribution to provide compensation for private 
wrongs. All could in principle be justified under the methodology of 
Ripstein's argument from the division of responsibility. From a 
Rawlsian perspective, the superiority of one such institutional 
arrangement over others depends entirely on whether that 
arrangement best advances the interest in enabling choice under 
conditions of equality. 
31. This is true, it should be noted, even if the duty extends beyond dangers to the 
person so as to apply to at least some cases of danger to property. 
32. It is sometimes argued that a duty of easy rescue cannot be justified because 
there is no principled basis for limiting the duty to situations where one could rescue 
another with little or no danger or inconvenience to oneself. See, e.g., Richard A. 
Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151, 190 (1973). This objection 
has some force within traditional deontological theory, but it has no purchase against 
a Rawlsian argument for a duty of easy rescue. This is because the existence and 
scope of the duty depend entirely on the degree to which it advances the interest in 
enabling choice, and a duty of easy rescue might well be superior in this respect to a 
more onerous duty. 
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As I noted at the beginning of this Essay, Rawls does not say a great 
deal about the relationship between corrective and distributive justice. 
It is nonetheless striking to observe that the arguments he does offer 
in support of the independence of the two forms of justice have 
exactly the pragmatic, consequentialist character that our earlier 
discussion of methodology would lead us to expect. Rawls appears to 
take corrective justice as a given, and then argues that because 
background (i.e., distributive) justice will be eroded "even when 
individuals act fairly," "we require special institutions to preserve 
background justice."33 He discusses the reason why we require special 
institutions in the following passage: 
[T]here are no feasible and practicable rules that it is sensible to 
impose on individuals that can prevent the erosion of background 
justice. This is because the rules governing agreements and 
individual transactions cannot be too complex, or require too much 
information to be correctly applied; nor should they enjoin 
individuals to engage in bargaining with many widely scattered third 
parties, since this would impose excessive transaction costs. The 
rules applying to agreements are, after all, practical and public 
directives, and not mathematical functions which may be as 
complicated as one can imagine. Thus any sensible scheme of rules 
will not exceed the capacity of individuals to grasp and follow them 
with sufficient ease, nor will it burden citizens with requirements of 
knowledge and foresight that they cannot normally meet.34 
Rawls apparently does not think that there is any deep issue of 
principle at stake here. He is, rather, expressing a highly pragmatic 
concern with keeping the rules for individuals as uncomplicated as 
possible. 
It is worth drawing attention to one other aspect of the argument 
that Rawls makes in the passage quoted in the preceding paragraph. 
He begins with the assumption that constraints of corrective justice 
are already in place and then argues that, for pragmatic reasons, we 
require special institutions of distributive justice. But Ripstein's 
argument seems to have a different structure. He begins with 
distributive principles and then argues that the related ideas of having 
one's fair share and being responsible for how one's own life goes 
require special institutions of corrective justice. If I have understood 
him correctly, Ripstein's argument in fact goes beyond this claim 
about institutions. He also maintains that the content of corrective 
justice, which he takes to be coextensive with the requirements of 
33. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 2, at 267. Notice that Rawls does not 
himself use the term "corrective justice." But he clearly has in mind the concept of 
interpersonal justice, which comes to the same thing. While Rawls's discussion 
focuses on contract law, most of what he has to say carries over fairly readily to the 
law of torts. 
34. /d. at 267-68. 
HeinOnline -- 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1855 2003-2004
2004] RIPSTEIN, RAWLS & RESPONSIBILITY 1855 
traditional deontological theory, can itself be derived from these 
ideas. There is, however, much to be said for the order of explanation 
proposed by Rawls. It suggests that corrective justice, understood as a 
set of deontological constraints, is normatively and conceptually prior 
to distributive justice. There is, on this view, no need to derive those 
constraints by means of a consequentialist argument that begins with 
the idea of having one's fair share. Rather the principles of 
distributive justice, and hence the meaning of having a fair share, must 
conform to the pre-political principles of corrective justice. How, it 
might be asked, can the content of deontological constraints be 
specified in the absence of defined entitlements to resources? In 
responding to this question it is natural to suggest that the foundation 
of such constraints must reside in the inviolability of the person or 
some similar notion. 3 5  When distributive justice enters the picture, the 
constraints are extended to fair shares of external resources and help 
to define the conceptual boundaries of such shares. 3 6  I believe that 
this general understanding of the relationship between corrective and 
distributive justice informs, at least implicitly, much contemporary 
deontological theorizing. To say anything more about these very 
fundamental matters is, however, well beyond the scope of this Essay. 
35. Cf F.M. Kamm, Nonconsequentialism, in The Blackwell Guide to Ethical 
Theory 205, 217 (Hugh LaFollette ed., 2000). Another possibility is, of course, Kant's 
own argument for a principle of equal right. The relationship between the right to be 
secure in one's person and the right to property is a controversial issue in Kantian 
scholarship, and cannot be discussed here. For differing views on this question, see 
Paul Guyer, Kant's Deductions of the Principles of Right, in Kant: Metaphysics of 
Morals (Mark Timmons ed., 2000), and Ripstein, Authority and Coercion, supra note 
28, at 11-14. In the article under discussion in this Essay, Ripstein argues as follows: 
[T]he division of responsibility mandates that we treat each person as free to 
do as he or she sees fit with the means at his or her disposal, that is, to use 
both bodily powers and income and wealth in pursuit of his or her own 
conception of the good, in a way consistent with others having the same 
freedom to pursue their conception of the good. All of this is done within a 
broader framework of redistributive institutions, the other half of the 
division of responsibility. Personal powers and property are alike in their 
significance to the claims of other private parties, and so subject to a parallel 
treatment in tort. 
Ripstein, supra note 1, at 1836. Personal powers and property may well be alike in 
this respect, but that is quite consistent with the idea that integrity of the person has 
moral priority over property rights and that the reason these interests are subject to a 
parallel treatment in tort is that property rights receive protection similar to those 
accorded to security of the person. I take Ripstein to be suggesting, in effect, that the 
argument goes in the other direction: Security of the person is protected because 
bodily powers are, like property rights, means for pursuing a conception of the good. 
It is perhaps worth remarking in this regard that Rawls treats integrity of the person 
as falling under the first principle of justice (the principle of equal liberty), while 
property falls under the difference principle, which is part of the second principle. See 
John Rawls, Reply to Alexander and Musgrave, 88 Q.J. Econ. 633, 640 (1974). The 
first principle has, of course, lexical priority over the second. 
36. Cf Perry, supra note 4, at 253-63. 
